Most people are risk-averse (risk-seeking) when they expect to gain (lose).
People are sensitive to risk, a characteristic also observed in animals such as rats, birds and honeybees [1] . The usual preference for a sure choice over an alternative of equally or even more favorable expected value is called risk aversion. Actually, most people feel aversion to risk when they expect, with moderate or high probability, to gain and attraction to risk when they expect to lose. These tendencies are inverted for very low probabilities [2] . Certainly, this pattern of attitudes affects most human decisions since chance factors are always present, e.g., in medical strategies, in gambling or in economic transactions. In particular, in the context of finances, the attitude of economic operators under risky choices clearly is one of the main ingredients to be kept in mind for realistically modeling market dynamics.
In economics, traditionally, the analysis of decision making under risk was treated through the "expected utility theory" (EUT) [3] , on the assumption that individuals make rational choices. More precisely, the expected value E, corresponding to the prospect P ≡ (x 1 , p 1 ; . . . ; x n , p n ) such that the outcome x i (gain if positive; loss if negative) occurs with probability p i , is given by E(P) = n i=1 χ(x i ) p i , where the weighting function χ(x i ) monotonically increases with x i . (Clearly, a statistically fair game corresponds to χ(x i ) = x i .) There are however aspects of risk sensitivity that are not adequately contemplated within EUT. Such features were exhibited, through experiments with hypothetical choice problems, by Kahneman and Tversky [2] . They then proposed a generalization to EUT equation within "prospect theory" (PT) [2] :
, where the weighting function Π(p i ) monotonically increases with p i . Its typical shape (corresponding to the most frequent human attitude) is presented in Fig. 1 , as sketched by Tversky and collaborators [2, 4] on the ground of experiments and observations. The weight Π(p) is, basically, concave for low and convex for high probabilities, with Π(0) = 0 and Π(1) = 1. Moreover, most individuals satisfy (i) Π(p) + Π(1 − p) ≤ 1 (the equality holds for p = 0, 1) (subcertainty), (ii) Π(p s)/Π(p) ≤ Π(p r s)/Π(p r) for 0 < p, r, s ≤ 1 (subproportionality), (iii) Π(p) < (>)p for high (low) probabilities (under(over)weighting), and, (iv) for very low probabilities, Π(p r) > rΠ(p) for 0 < r < 1 (subadditivity). The fol-lowing functional forms have been proposed [5] in the context of nonextensive statistical mechanics [6] :
, usually referred to as escort probability. Other functional forms are also available in the literature [7] , such as
, where A > 0. Clearly, A = 1 recovers the escort probability and for appropriate choices of (q, A), the latter expression can satisfy all the properties detailed above. In all these cases, each individual is characterized by a set of parameters which yields a particular Π(p) representing the subjective processing that the individual makes of known probabilities p in a chance game.
More recently, PT was generalized [8] using a rank dependent or cumulative representation where the "decision weight" multiplying the value of each outcome is distinguished from the probability weight. This interesting generalization is however irrelevant for the present study. Indeed, we will deal here with simple prospects with a single positive outcome, hence both versions coincide.
In the present work we investigate the consequences of risk averse attitudes in the dynamics of economic operations. In order to do so we apply methods of statistical physics.
This strategy has proved to be very useful in several previous works [9] (see also [10] for general discussions on the application of statistical physics methods in economy). Here we introduce an automaton simulating monetary transactions among operators with different attitudes under risky choices. Elementary operations are of the standard type used in hypothetical choice problems that exhibit risk aversion [2] . By following the time evolution of the asset position of the operators, it will be possible to conclude on the consequences of each particular attitude.
We will restrict our study to the regime of moderate and high probabilities where most people are risk averse for gains. In this regime, human behavior can be satisfactorily described by the weighting function Π(p) = p q . This expression, which has a simpler form than other weights describing the full domain, is the one adopted in the present work. Furthermore, since we will focus on probabilistic factors, we assume that all individuals have the simplest utility function, namely χ(x) = x. Adopting these choices and, additionally, assuming that the probability weight Π(p) is the same for gains and losses, a unique parameter (q) characterizes each individual according to the attitude under risky choices. An ideally rational individual has q = 1 while most individuals "feel" probabilities with q > 1.
The present automaton simulates monetary transactions among N operators. We assume for simplicity that in each elementary transaction two agents participate. One of them proposes to the other a choice between two alternative ways of either paying money or of receiving money. As an illustration of the former case, the proponent typically asks: "What do you prefer: to receive a certain quantity X or to play a game where you receive Y with probability P , such that P Y = X, and nothing with probability 1 − P ?". More precisely, the alternative choices are: 1) a certain prospect P = (±α S, 1), with α > 0, and 2) a risky one P = (±S, P ; 0, 1 − P ), where S is a positive quota and the +/− apply to the cases when the proponent receives/pays. The value of α depends on the psychological factors q of both operators in a way that will be defined below for each one of the models conceived.
The also possible case where the choice is between a fixed certain prospect P = (±S , 1) and a variable risky one P = (±αS, P ; 0, 1 − P ) will not be analyzed here since it yields quite analogous results. Along the dynamics, the probability P and the quota S, the two parameters characterizing the elementary operations, are kept fixed. Clearly, the present games are not the kind of operations that actually occur in a financial market. However in the sense of the theory of financial decisions, they illustrate the risk aversion phenomenon.
Let us consider N agents with values of q uniformly distributed in the interval [
For simplicity we take
k has an initial amount of money M k (0). In each time step, a transaction between the agents of a randomly chosen ordered pair (i,j) occurs. The exchanged quantity is taken positive if the proponent (i) is the one who receives the money and negative otherwise. Whether the exchanged quantity is positive (i receives the money) or negative (j receives the money), it is randomly drawn at each step of the dynamics.
Restrictions on the level of indebtedness of the operators can be imposed. We consider three cases (NR, OR and PR): In case NR, there are no restraints and operators can be indebted without limit; in OR, there are opportunistic restraints and agents can also operate indefinitely except that they do not pay when they would have to do so if at a given step of the dynamics their asset become less than a minimal quantity M * (i.e., operators can become swindlers occasionally); finally, in PR, agents become permanently forbidden to trade from the instant when their assets fall below the threshold M * . This threshold introduces nonlinearity into the problem.
For each one of these three cases, other variations (A, S and C) were considered following different definitions of α: in A (alter-referential), operator i, the proponent, somehow knows the psychology of j (q j ); in S (self-referential), operator i ignores q j and hence attributes to j her/his own value of q; finally, in C (consensual), operators i and j act by consensus.
In variations A and S, the proponent, i, will present, according to the hypothesis made on the q of j (q hyp j taken to be q j for model A and q i for model S), a certain alternative which i considers the worst between the one which has the same standard expected value as the game (±P S) and the one that i believes to have for j the same expectation as the game (±P q hyp j S). This opportunistic behavior can be expressed through the factor α, as presented below:
Case A: α = min(max){P, P q j } if i pays(takes).
Case S: α = min(max){P, P q i } if i pays(takes).
Note that, in a statistically fair game, it should be α = P so that both prospects (the certain and the risky ones) would have the same standard expected value. On the other hand, agent j will choose the risky prospect either 1) if P q j > α when i pays or 2) if P q j < α when i takes or 3) in 50% of the cases if P q j = α.
Case C: In this instance, there is not a proponent and both players have a symmetric role arriving to a consensus. Hence, let us consider without loss of generality, the case when i pays and j takes. If q i < q j there is agreement for the risky alternative, otherwise, the agreement is for the certain choice with α an intermediate value between P q i and P q j , for instance, as we will adopt, α = (
Combining all these possibilities, we have a total of nine models: (NR,A), (NR,S),. . .,(PR,C).
Let us discuss first the models of the type (NR,*), for which there is no indebtedness restriction. The amount of money of operator i at time t, M i (t), in average over a large number of realizations (histories), is given by
where
, such that the G matrix has non negative elements. For instance, for case (NR,C), explicitly one has
The continuum approximation of V i for all models (NR,*), considering uniform distribu-
(1 − q)P + 1 2
V (q) vs q for models (NR,*) is illustrated in Fig. 2 . V (q) rules the average evolution of assets, being
From Fig. 2a corresponding to a more realistic distribution of q than Fig. 2b (since about 75% of the people are risk averse when high probabilities are involved), note that for (NR,A) (where the proponent knows the psychology of the other) the maximum emerges at q = 1 (the rational player) while for (NR,S) (where the proponent acts following the own psychology)
we observe the emergence of a minimum at q = 1 and of two maxima on both sides of q = 1 being the absolute maximum the one for q > 1 (agents who are conservative for gains).
Case (NR,C) (consensus) corresponds to an intermediate situation where the maximum asset increase occurs for q above 1.
For models (OR,*) and (PR,*) the average time evolution of M is not linear with t. In these cases, the evolution follows Eq. (1) (or its continuous version Eq. (4)) up to time τ when some agent's asset falls below the threshold M * . In models (OR,*), from that instant on, the discrete Markovian automaton can be described, in average, by
where 
In fact, (−V (q)) acts as the potential of an effective drift which rules the dynamics. In Fig.   3 , M(q, t), averaged over several realizations, vs. q, is illustrated for models (OR,*). The maxima of M , M max , and its corresponding q, q max , are plotted as a function of time t in For models (PR,*), the dynamics follows a different evolution. M(q, t) evolves to a Dirac δ function centered at q = 1 or at the boundary closer to q = 1 (see Fig. 4 ). As for the (OR,*) models, the stability is controlled by watching M max and q max vs t. Note that in all cases q max → 1, although for case (PR,S) the convergence is slower. Therefore, with this kind of indebtedness restraint, the more rational operator wins at the long term. Here the final state does not depend on the distribution of q, which will just generate a different V (q), as soon as it contains q = 1 (if not, the boundary closer to q = 1 wins). On the other hand, the final state depends on the initial distribution of assets once some individuals may have assets below the threshold and are forbidden to play from the beginning.
On average, the rational player (with q = 1) wins from every other (G uj − G ju ≥ 0, ∀j and q u = 1). That is why with restraints of type PR such player is the long term winner.
Operators with extreme values of q are long term losers. With indebtedness restrictions of kind PR, they have to abandon the game. With restrictions of kind OR (cheating is not forbidden), they are allowed to remain in the game, but their assets keep fluctuating close to the threshold M * . A non trivial steady state appears in this case. Operators with q k a bit above one (a bit risk averse for gains) lose from some neighbors but win more in the total sum, i.e., j (G kj − G jk ) ≥ 0), as soon as those with extreme values of q remain in the game.
Consequently, the maximum of the steady state is located at q above one (primacy of the conservatives). In case (OR,*) the initial distribution of parameter q will affect the form of the function V and therefore the shape of the steady state governed by the effective potential (−V ). On the other hand, the steady state does not depend on the initial distribution of money.
In conclusion, the type of conditions limiting indebtedness are critical for defining the nature of the long term evolution, i.e., existence or not of a nontrivial steady state. The details of this steady state depend, among other factors, on the distribution of the parameter q of the operators. One also observes that the final state is invariant under initial redistribution of money. Paradoxically enough, some level of cheating avoids extreme wealth inequality to become the stationary state. However, one must keep in mind that the distribution of q is kept fixed along the dynamics and, therefore, the psychological effect of asset position is not taken into account in the present model. Such dynamics would provide an improved, more realistic model. In fact, a model which, in addition to this learning-from-experience dynamics, would use a weight such as that of Fig. 1 simultaneously with an appropriate nonlinear utility function, might very well constitute a quite realistic frame for taking into account the well known human risk aversion in the context of collective trading.
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